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THE INFLUENCE OF BORROWER GOVERNMENTS ON DEFINING
WORLD BANK LOAN CONDITIONS
MJ Peterson
University of Massachusetts Amherst
A significant portion of the literature on the World Bank treats it as a mechanism by
which other actors impose their beliefs about how to pursue development on borrower
governments through the conditions attached to World Bank loans. In many accounts, the
imposers are the governments of the USA or the G7 states using it as a foreign policy tool
making the world safe for capitalism as they define it (e.g., Pauly 1998; Stone 2011). In others,
the imposer is the World Bank itself, a bureaucracy that escapes even US or G7 control (Barnett
and Finnemore 2004; Haftel and Thompson 2006; Delreaux and Kerremans 2010). Analysts
taking either view regard borrower governments as having no influence over the substantive
content of loan conditions either at a particular moment or over time. Yet the shaping of loan
condition content is not as uni-directional as these accounts suggest; borrowers have affected the
number and content of loan conditions through their own responses. This possibility arises
because its own organizational survival means the World Bank needs borrowers to continue its
activity as much as borrower governments need loans to advance their economic development.
This dynamic has been visible in recent years as borrower governments have been able to shop
for loans from more sources, making it more difficult for the World Bank to set policy conditions
(acknowledged in World Bank 2009: 16 for middle income countries; Prizzon, Greenhill and
Mustapha, 2016 and Hernandez 2017 extend the point to low income countries as well). Yet
borrower governments did have some influence over World Bank policy conditions even in the
1980s. How they acquired and used this influence in those earlier decades is revealed more
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clearly by understanding the interactions between borrower governments and the World Bank as
involving co-participants in an authority relationship than by using the more prevalent “tool of
the great powers” or “runaway bureaucracy” perspectives.
An authority relationship involves two types of participating actors, the first with rights to
instruct others regarding what to do and the second with obligations to follow the instructions.
In national-level politics, the words “rulers,” “governors,” “commanders,” or “superiors” are
used for the actors with rights to instruct, and the words “subjects,” “governed,” “commanded”
or “subordinates” are used for the actors with obligations to follow instructions. Yet authority
relationships are not entirely top-down; there are significant bottom-up components in the shared
expectations on which an authority relationship is based.

By setting expectations about how

both instruction-giver and the instruction-receivers will behave, these shared expectations
channel instruction-giving and instruction-receiving in particular ways and create possibilities for
the withdrawal or reformulation of instructions. To highlight this reality and avoid the steeply
hierarchical connotations of the usual words used to describe the participants, the phrase
“authority holder” will designate the actor with rights to instruct and word “addressee(s)” for the
actor(s) expected to follow instructions in what follows.
Providing loans gives the World Bank a basis for instructing borrowers, so puts it in the
authority holder position, while the characteristics of an authority relationship create affordances
providing the borrower governments with opportunities to influence the number and content of
instructions. It might be objected that an IGO can hardly function as an authority holder vis-svis member states because it typically lacks the resources to back its instructions with sufficient
punishments or rewards to induce compliance by reluctant members. That equates holding
authority with ability to coerce. However, there are other bases for holding authority. One is
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greater expertise in a particular area, with addressees deferring because they are aware the
authority holder can better identify the actions that will lead to goal attainment than they can
themselves. Another, far more common among IGOs, is an act of delegation by which member
governments entrust the organization with particular tasks and agree to comply with decisions
(e.g., Nielson and Tierney 2003; Lyne, Nelson, and Tierney 2006). The World Bank Articles of
Agreement are an explicit act of delegation, and Bank financial officers and project managers
quickly developed a reputation for competence (Lewis and Kapur 1973: 3-4; Ohman 1973: 27;
Crook 1986: 10-11). More general in-house development expertise was also created through reinstituting the Economics Department in the mid-1960s (Oliver 1975: 275). Having money to
lend also meant that the Bank had something that borrower members desired particularly in the
early post-World War II decades when private investors remained cautious about loans to
developing country governments.
To plausibly hold authority, an IGO must also be able to demonstrate autonomy from any
one member government or small group of member governments. The long discussions of the
World Bank as a foreign policy tool assume that the World Bank lacks such autonomy, either
from the US government or the G7 governments as a group. The executive heads and staffs of
IGOs are aware of this problem, and, as students of bureaucracy (Ness and Brechlin 1988;
Vaubel 1996; Frey 1997; Barnett and Finnemore 2004) explain, actively work to carve out and
maintain autonomy.
One source of World Bank autonomy stems from its functioning as a financial
intermediary selling bonds to private investors and relending the proceeds to borrower
governments. This has enhanced management’s autonomy vis-à-vis the major shareholders,
particularly as Bank bonds have been sold in more countries and denominated in more currencies
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(21 currencies are listed in World Bank Annual Report 2015: 55). World Bank leadership was
initially unenthusiastic about adding the subsidized interest rate IDA loans to its portfolio
because the money would be raised as contributions from governments of wealthier member
states and it feared the loss of autonomy having to negotiate a new replenishment every three
years would entail (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997: 1120). Successive Bank presidents and vice
presidents worked hard to maintain their margin for flexibility (Oliver 1975: 261*; Reddy 1985:
29-31; Narasimhan 1989: 35, n. 40), and Bank Presidents, though appointed at US government
initiative, have regarded doing so as one of their duties (e.g. advice from outgoing president
Lewis Preston recounted in Wolfensohn 2010: 263; (Mallaby 2004: 192-3). The World Bank
has challenges maintaining autonomy, but on the whole has enough that it is reasonable to
analyze its relations with member governments, particularly those seeking loans, as an authority
relationship.
The elements of an authority relationship that provide borrower governments with
opportunities to influence instructions exist in the shared expectations that hold an authority
relationship together. These are often divided into substantive and procedural expectations (e.g.,
Scharpf 1997; Grant and Keohane 2005). However, that two-element distinction oversimplifies.
Taking hints from some elements of legal and philosophical discussions (e.g., McDougal 1959:
6; Bayles 1976: 105) and arguments that following instructions involves addressees suspending,
rather than surrendering, their ability to assess their relevance and usefulness (Day 1963: 268;
Benn 1967: 217; Rosenblum 1987: 106; Rosler 2005: 95-98), a more adequate conception
divides the shared expectations into 3 sets of procedural expectations and 4 sets of substantive
expectations. The procedural expectations are specifications of:
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Selection: the qualifications and selection process by which the role of instruction-giver is
assigned to one or more particular actors;
Addressees: the rules defining the set of actors assigned to roles of receiving and
following the instructions; and
Procedures: the forms and ways in which instructions should be conveyed to addressees
The substantive expectations are specifications of:
Goal: the purpose or outcome to be pursued;
Area: the subjects on, or issue areas within which, instructions may be given;
Relevance: the types of actions addressees may be instructed to take or avoid; and
Efficacy: whether and to what extent continued cooperation within the authority
relationship has actually produced progress toward the goal.
Though institutionalizing the shared beliefs about how the relationship should work in formal
rules like contracts or international agreements provides particular criteria with a certain amount
of stability, all of them are likely to change over time as new technologies emerge, the circle of
participants changes by addition or subtraction, or participants adopt different beliefs about what
actions will or will not enhance goal attainment.
The statement of goal is central to the relationship in three ways. First, it ties the
participants together by providing the motivation for collaborating through the relationship.
Second, it provides the reference point for assessing the success of the cooperation. Third, its
specificity or diffuseness establishes the amount of leeway available for interpreting and
redefining the relevance and efficacy goals. A very precise goal, such as Millennium
Development Goal 4 of a 2/3s reduction in the morality rate of persons under 5 by the end of
2015, offers little room for divergent interpretation. A very diffuse goal, such as “promote
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economic development” is open to more varied interpretation and the possibility of redefining
what constitutes goal attainment.
The relevance and efficacy criteria guide, but are also shaped by, addressees’ perceptions
of whether continuing to participate in the authority relationship is worthwhile. These
perceptions change over time, as contention about what should be regarded as relevant and
efficacious proceeds. Assessment of an instruction’s relevance is based on a prospective
assessment of whether following the instruction will contribute to goal attainment. The
relevance criteria reflect shared beliefs, formed by current knowledge and recent experience,
about the probability that adopting any of the known action paths will lead to goal attainment.
Their substantive content thus derives from the causal beliefs about what actions will or will not
contribute to desired outcomes that prevail among authority holders and addressees at any time.
Yet these beliefs about the relation between action paths and goal attainment will shift
over time as experience yields more information about the success of the courses of action
attempted or inspires developing new action paths. Thus the efficacy criteria are based on a
retrospective assessment of whether doing as instructed has actually promoted goal attainment.
Over time, then, the sense of what particular instructions are relevant and efficacious can shift,
leading in the first instance to changes in recommended action paths but sometimes to
redefinition of the goal, of the areas of activity instructions should cover, or both.
1. Assessing the Relevance and Efficacy of World Bank Instructions.
While the broad goal of economic development (or simply “development”) has been
shared by the World Bank and all of its member governments throughout the Bank’s existence,
both the indicators with which development is assessed and beliefs about what are the more and
less efficacious action paths to development have been topics of continual contestation involving
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national governments’ political leaders and economic policy makers, the World Bank’s leaders
and staff, other IGOs’ leaders and staff, academics, and development or environment-oriented
NGOs and transnational advocacy coalitions. Focusing on how these arguments affect the
workings of the World Bank-member government authority relationship yields greater
understanding of how and to what extent borrower governments have been able to influence
changes in instructions that form the World Bank’s lending policies and loan decisions.
Evaluating whether there has been progress toward the goal is easier or harder depending
on the specificity of the goal and the clarity of paths from actions to results. Goals can range
from very broad to very precise while action paths can range from very clear to very fuzzy. This
produces a four quadrant conceptual space within which the various combinations of goal type
and action path type can be arrayed:
clear path

broad goal

precise goal

fuzzy path

Development is a very broad goal. Yet governments, policy analysts and academic economists
do possess some reasonably clear quantifiable indicators of progress toward development,
including total GDP, per capita GDP, the Human Development Index, and physical qualify of
life measures. Though incomplete measures each does provide a way to identify the relative
success of individual countries’ efforts to develop. There has been some shift in mix of
indicators used over the last 70 years. Per capita GDP, which corrects for population size, has
been used continuously and is a useful shorthand for classifying countries by levels of
development. However is does not capture information about unpaid work, such as child rearing
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and maintaining households, or paid work outside the formal economy of recorded employment.
These limitations inspired search for other measures, and some alternatives became more
feasible in the 1980s when reasonably systematic household consumption surveys began to be
carried out and provided an “on the ground” supplement to the increasingly standardized and
consistent country statistical data on life outcomes such as literacy, education levels, health,
births and deaths. In 1990, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) was able to offer a
Human Development Index using per capita GDP, literary rates, and life expectancy in a singlenumber format that directly challenged using GDP per capita alone. Ten years later, the UN
Millennium Development Goals were stated as the percentage of the population experiencing
some life outcome (such as infant mortality) or having access to basic material things (such as
safe drinking water or vaccination against diseases). The Sustainable Development Goals are
stated in similar fashion, adding indicators of environmental conditions to the mix. When
economic inequality became a distinct concern in the late 2000s, reliance on the single-number
Gini Index was superseded by comparing the income shares of each quintile of the population
from poorest 20% to wealthiest 20%, with “the 1%” at the top separated out to emphasize how
narrowly economic growth has been shared in some countries.
It could always be argued that loans provided by the World Bank through its standard
market-rate lending (“Bank loans”) or its lower interest rate loans through its International
Development Association affiliate (“IDA loans”) was not a significant factor in development. In
the 1950s and 1960s, all official development aid – bilateral as well as multilateral – comprised
some 60% of the foreign finance coming to developing countries. The fraction fell to about 20%
in the early 1980s (Reddy 1985: 3-4) then settled after 1990 at about 30% (OECD 2016: Table
2). Bank and IDA loans were only a part of that flow. In 1983, World Bank and IDA loans
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covered less than 5% of members’ external finance needs (Hoguet 1983: 318). In the mid-1990s
their total was equivalent to 10-15% of annual payments for imports in the smallest countries, 25% of annual investment needs for middle-sized countries, and a “drop in an ocean of need” for
the largest low income countries (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997: 2). Yet there have been
occasions when Bank or IDA loans were important. In 1982 IDA loans provided 13% of all
domestic investment in Bangladesh and 10% in Burundi (Pennant-Rea 1982: 46). Even where
the overall percentages were lower, Bank or IDA loans were often the only way some developing
countries could finance large projects or programs requiring long-term finance because of their
weak credit rating in private markets. In addition, the World Bank has had a prominence in
defining how multilateral development aid should work that has made contenting over its loan
conditions worthwhile.
Assessment of the relevance and efficacy of World Bank lending has involved two
continuing questions: the best balance between project and program lending, and whether the
policy conditions attached to World Bank, IDA, or IMF loans enhance or hinder prospects for
development. The debate has been vigorous, and various conclusions have been advanced with
considerable confidence. However it has not produced an expert consensus about the relative
efficacy of different action paths sufficient to create shared beliefs about efficacy (see, e.g.,
Boone 1996; Easterly 2003; Hansen and Tarp 2000; Hudson and Moseley 2001; Kusick and
Tobin 2006; Bearce and Tirone 2010). This is not surprising since analysts in different parts of
the political spectrum formulate their evaluations from different ideological and theoretical
starting points. Yet there are also two other obstacles to consensus that operate independently of
political ideologies or economic theories.
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The first is the fungibility of money. Receiving Bank or IDA loan money frees up an
equivalent amount of money from other sources that a borrower government can use for other
purposes (Rosenstein-Rodin, 1943; Pack and Pack 1990; Boone 1996; Feyzioglu, Swaroop and
Zhu 1998; Bader and Faust 2014). Though many current discussions of fungiblity focus on how
aid helps governments use that other money to reward supporters and stay in power (e.g. Moss,
Pettersson and Van de Waal 2008) or to persist in policies that are not working, that freed-up
money can be used for a wide variety of purposes ranging from armed conflict to enhanced
social programs. Since each government decides for itself how to exploit fungibility, there is no
way to draw general conclusions about its effect on pursuing development.
The second obstacle arises from technical problems in using statistical methods of
analysis to assessing change in economic conditions. As William Easterly – an analyst skeptical
of most claims about the efficacy of aid – noted, it is very difficult to identify causal mechanisms
via statistical analysis because the number of factors identified as potential causes makes moving
from correlation to cause very difficult (Easterly 2008: 18).
2. Stages in the Debates over Relevance and Efficacy
Neither the fungibility nor the causal analysis difficulties stand in the way of analyzing
borrower government influence over the content of World Bank conditions. There is good
evidence of negotiating at particular times. There is also good evidence for borrower
government engagement in the formulation of changes in relevance and efficacy criteria guiding
Word Bank relations with borrower members over time. The pace of change was fairly slow
through the mid-1980s, accelerated significantly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, then dropped
to a less rapid pace after 1997.
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2.1. Differences of View but Relatively Low Contention, 1945-1965
Three basic visions of how to best promote development competed between 1945 and
roughly 1965: 1) a market-centered mainly private enterprise vision strongest in the USA and
West Germany, 2) a mixed economy version combining indicative planning with a combination
of private and state-owned enterprise strongest in the UK and France, and 3) a centrally-planned
economy with all production and distribution accomplished through state enterprise in the Soviet
Union. Each offered different answers to three key questions for development. Both the marketfocused and mixed economy Western visions rested on assumptions that a significant amount of
production and distribution should be allowed to proceed without direct government command,
the benefits of economic growth would be widely – even if unevenly – distributed, and those
benefits would be greatest if national economies were linked together through trade and
investment. The Soviet vision assumed that central planning, reliance on state enterprises, and
carefully limited linkages between economies would be most conducive to growth and also
reduce economic inequality and assure eradication of poverty. The World Bank was clearly
aligned with the Western visions, providing loans and loan instructions compatible with either
the market or the mixed economy versions.
A fourth vision of promoting development through import substituting industrialization
(ISI) was elaborated in the UN Economic Commission for Latin America under the leadership of
Raul Prebisch (Prebisch 1950) and similar thinking influenced African governments’
development policies in the 1960s (Frieden 2006: 309-312 and 317-320; Ake 2001: 219-20).
The action path it suggested combined limiting trade connections to other economies with
establishing extensive state enterprise in manufacturing and other key sectors to produce desired
manufactured goods at home. The differences between ISI and Western models were real, but
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not sources of serious contention in the 1960s because of two assumptions among Western
governments and academic economists. First, all Western governments shared the Keynesian
consensus that governments should engage in macroeconomic management, and many went
further by running a mixed economy; thus the contrast among government policies short of
central planning was perceived as a difference emphasis rather than a difference in type of
policy. Second, academic economists and their counterparts in the World Bank and government
development agencies also agreed that governments of developing countries would need to take
on a significant coordinating role until industrialization was well underway (Moulton 1978: 1020
notes the similar views then prevailing in the US Agency for International Development and
among the Indian and Pakistani economists guiding many World Bank activities). Thus there
was room for accommodating many of the points raised by ISI advocates.
The World Bank did indicate some clear preferences regarding borrowers’ economic
choices. In the 1950s these included remaining creditworthy by following “generally acceptable
policies” including elimination of regressive taxes, public sector waste, and corruption; fiscal and
monetary policy geared to keeping inflation low, avoiding high tariffs and other forms of
economic nationalism, having a “suitable” development program, and also putting their own
resources to work through counterpart contributions. In the 1960s Bank preferences included
stronger emphasis on opening up to more international trade and, with project loans, some
sector-specific conditions like rules for setting rates for power produced in Bank-financed
electricity generation plants (Narasimhan 1989: 19-20). Loan negotiations and the broader
policy dialogues between senior World Bank staff and borrower governments that began in 1968
were not particularly contentious because of the Bank’s willingness to accept both market and
mixed economy approaches. Differences in the economic growth rates of different countries and
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regions were not as great as they would become later, meaning that there were no clear
indications of the relative efficacy of different the action paths adopted under different policy
approaches.
Lack of contention over paths to development did not mean borrowers were fully content
with World Bank instructions. While most borrowers accepted that the World Bank would only
fund specific projects, borrower governments viewed the process of securing a loan complex and
demanding. The detailed notes on individual loan discussions in early World Bank Annual
Reports reveal that getting from outlining the initial idea for a project to securing Board approval
of a loan to finance it took at least three years. As one developing country diplomat put it in the
mid-1950s, borrowing countries "stand like prisoners in the dock," questioned intensely about a
proposed project and its feasibility (quoted in Heilbroner 1956: 20). They also complained that
financial criteria were applied too stringently and policy conditions leaned too far in the direction
of keeping inflation law (Morris 1963: 62-63). Other borrower government complaints about
lending reflected differences in middle income and low income country needs. Middle income
borrowers thought the Bank emphasized low income country needs too much, while many low
income ones wanted more financing for urban housing projects and agriculture than the Bank
was providing (Morris 1963: 63).
Low income borrower concerns began to be addressed more directly as the Bank started
paying more attention to poverty reduction under Robert McNamara’s leadership (Morawetz
1977; Moseley Harrington and Toye 1995). Though the major shareholder governments were
not particularly enthusiastic (Morawetz 1977) borrower governments strongly supported the
Bank’s decisions to allocate some 25% of total loan money to program loans (G24 1977: par. 5ii;
Narasimhan 1989: 30). For their part, Bank staff saw it as giving more scope for poverty-
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reduction considerations and as a way to loosen the financial requirements of project lending in
sub-Saharan Africa where the economic downturn after the 1973 oil price increases made it more
difficult to identify projects there that would be self-supporting even at IDA’s subsidized interest
rates (Mosley, Harrington, and Toye 1995: 22). However it is not clear that program loans were
easier to arrange; only 26 were approved before 1980 (Pennant-Rea 1982: 46).
2.2 Oil Prices, Debt Crisis and Sharp Contention 1973-1986
Persistence of much higher fuel costs after the quadrupling of crude oil prices in 1973
had broad economic effects that inspired more intense debate about the relevance and efficacy of
different paths to development. OPEC’s apparent success at wresting money and a degree of
economic decision-making power from the Western industrial states inspired grand visions of
creating a state-centric New International Economic Order (NIEO) with a new set of global
economic institutions. In the NIEO vision, governments, not “the market” (the aggregate of
private decisions) would determine which sectors to encourage and set politically sensitive
prices, commodity cartels or other agreements would solve the problem of falling prices for most
commodities in relation to the prices of manufactured goods central to Prebisch’s and
dependency theorists’ analyses of international trade, and major decisions about the shape of
economic interconnections between countries would be made in intergovernmental forums where
the G77 of developing states held a majority of the votes rather than forums like the World Bank
where Western industrial countries held most of the votes.
The extent of contention became obvious during the Sixth (1974) and Seventh (1975)
Special Sessions of the UN General Assembly, which were convened to consider the G77’s
proposals for organizing the NIEO (e.g., UN General Assembly Resolution 3281). These met as
debate among academic analysts of development sharpened with Marxists (e.g., Baran 1975),
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world systems theorists (e.g., Wallerstein 1974, 1979) and dependency theorists (e.g., Gunder
Frank 1967; Amin 1976; Ake 1979) advocating even greater focus on self-reliant development
than the structuralists around Prebisch. They did not have the field to themselves, however.
Academic and policy analysis in the moderate left and the center rejected the claim that countries
could only develop if they insulated themselves from the international economy. Though they
did accept the general proposition that certain aspects of the international economy do favor
some economies over others, they also maintained that a government’s own choice of policies
were at least as important in determining a country’s development (e.g., Balassa, Bueno,
Kuczynski, and Simonsen, 1986; Fajnzylber 1986; Johnson 1987: 127-28).
ISI as practiced in Latin America and parts of South Asia had produced a significant
amount of industrialization by 1970 (Fieldhouse 1986: 152-53; Frieden 1991; Johnson 1983;
Vaidyanathan 1983; helpful statistical compilation in Mitchell 1998a and b). Those governments
continued to pursue ISI in the 1970s, while the dependency ideas had more influence in Africa
where they meshed well with the nationalist and anti-colonialist aspirations of many African
governments (Ake 2001: 219-20).
Meanwhile the World Bank continued to follow its already-established routines for loan
negotiations, partly from internal beliefs about lending – the World Bank’s analysts believed that
many features of ISI were hobbling rather than accelerating economic growth – and partly to
maintain credibility in among the international investors from whom it raised the money it used
for lending. However it did shift emphasis among desired outcomes by paying more attention to
poverty reduction and formally adopting a category of “program loans” more adaptable to multisector packages of financing to address various aspects of urban and rural poverty.
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The economic challenges posed by the quadrupling of oil process in 1973 were
particularly severe for developing counties that needed to import oil because OPEC members
wanted payment in hard currency, which developing countries could get only by increasing their
export earnings or by securing loans, initially hardened positions. Latin American governments
reaffirmed their belief in ISI; African governments reaffirmed theirs in state-led central planning,
and both continued to use the array of price controls, allocation of foreign exchange and credit
according to government-set priorities, and heavy reliance on state-owned enterprises on which
those paths to development were based (Frieden 1991, *).
In the 1970s many developing country governments were able to find the money through
private loans, which were available because OPEC countries were putting a significant part of
their higher export earnings into dollar-denominated accounts in leading Western banks. World
Bank leadership shared the widespread view that this extensive private borrowing would give
developing country governments time to reallocate their own investments to existing or new
sectors capable of providing greater export earnings, or otherwise adjust to new economic
conditions (e.g. discussion of trends in World Bank Annual Report 1977: 15-16). While some
did adjust, many used the loans to continue the extensive importing of inputs and machinery
needed to pursue import substitution industrialization.
The most public contention over action paths to development arose in Africa where little
industrialization had occurred. In 1980, African governments reaffirmed their commitment to a
wide range of planning, reliance on state-owned enterprises, and using revenue from agricultural
exports to fund development through requiring farmers to sell their crops at government-set
prices to a state marketing board that did the exporting, in their Lagos Plan for Action (UN
Economic Commission for Africa 1980). A request from some African governments that World
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Bank staff assess regional prospects (Pennant-Rea 1982: 38) resulted in Accelerated
Development for Sub-Saharan Africa – An Agenda for Action (World Bank 1981), commonly
known as the Berg Report after its lead author. It offered two main conclusions: first, that
securing greater progress toward development will require African governments to adopt new
economic policies reducing the role of state agencies and enterprises in the economy and opening
the country to increased international trade, and, second, that even with changed policies African
countries would need a lot more financial assistance in the medium term than they have been
receiving. The first conclusion attracted much more attention than the second. Though African
finance ministers called the report “useful,” the planning ministers who had contributed to
formulation of the Lagos Plan of Action objected vehemently. Both the OAU and the UN
Economic Commission for Africa issued stinging critiques, with the OAU condemning the
Report’s recommendations as being “in fundamental contradiction with the political, economic,
and social aspirations of Africa” (Declaration of Tripoli 1982; also see Ndegwa 1997: 190). It
was also roundly criticized by representatives of OPEC countries, UNDP, UNICEF, and by
Western European governments at the 1982 OECD Development Assistance Committee’s High
Level Meeting as failing to give enough attention to the external causes of sub-Saharan Africa’s
economic woes (noted in Woods 2006: 144).
Yet the Berg Report was read carefully and considered in African capitals. Julius
Nyerere, the outspokenly socialist President of Tanzania, required his whole cabinet to read it
and report their reactions to it (Loxley 1983: 197). Meanwhile a Uganda Study team organized
by the Canadian International Development Research Centre and a 3-member “wise men’s
group” organized by World Bank President McNamara sought to bridge gaps by suggesting
programs involving less direct state steering than proposed in the Lagos Plan, but more attention
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to the need for some forms of state regulation and programs to mitigate the distributional effects
of adjustment than contained in the Berg Report (Woods 2006: 145).
Western government hostility to the NIEO and statements like the Lagos Plan was
intensified by the changes in economic thinking then gaining more influence with policy makers.
The oil price increases of the 1970s had confounded Keynesian economic analysis by having
both inflationary and deflationary effects. The price increases intensified the inflation that had
originated in overly expansionary US fiscal and monetary policy in the late 1960s, while also
causing recession because demand for oil remained high enough despite the 1973 quadrupling of
price to reduce economic activity in nearly all sectors of national economies. This combination,
quickly labeled “stagflation” was something not foreseen in Keynesian theory, and reduced
confidence in the overall Keynesian approach (Olson 1982: 192; Heilbroner and Milberg 1995:
14). This opened opportunities for a new generation of neoclassical economists, whom Kahler
(1990) called the “neoorthodox” to distinguish them from advocates of what became known as
“neoliberal” policies, to acquire policy influence. Rather than follow the older tendency to treat
macroeconomics and microeconomics as distinct elements of economic activity at different
levels of aggregation, they connected the two by looking for the microfoundations of macro
patterns (Lucas 1972 is often identified as the initiator; also see Lucas and Sargent 1979). They
were very skeptical of government-run economic activity and far more confident of the selfregulating nature of markets than Keynesians, Fabians, or proponents of mixed economies. In
the realm of economic policy, their most significant idea was replacing Keynesian
macroeconomic management in favor of a broadly monetarist approach emphasizing the
unhindered operation of markets. This conclusion rested on two main assumptions, that inflation
is caused by an over-large money supply, and that every economy has a “natural rate of
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unemployment,” a minimum that cannot be altered through Keynesian macroeconomic
managing (Phelps 1968 and more influentially Friedman 1968). As “stagflation” persisted,
advocates of this approach reached greater audiences with their increasingly trenchant critiques
of both Keynesian macroeconomic management and mixed economy policies.
The new influences became highly visible in the policies of the Thatcher government in
the UK after 1979 and the Reagan administration in the USA after 1981. Both adopted highly
market-oriented policies making a sharp break from the mixed economy approach in the UK and
acceptance of Keynesian policies in the USA. The West German government under Helmut
Kohl moved to a lesser extent in a similar direction while other Western European governments
persisted with their mixed economy visions. Policy debates in European Economic Community
member states were affected by negotiations regarding the practical implications of their
commitment to creating a single internal market and a common currency by 1992, which created
pressures to allow markets greater scope (summary in Pinder and Usherwood 2007: chapter 4).
With appointment of investment banker A.W. Clausen as President of the World Bank in 1981
and academic Anne Kruger as Chief Economist in 1982, outside perceptions that the Word Bank
would be a strong supporter of Thatcher-Reagan style policies increased (Ferreira and Keeley
2000: 176).
Yet inside the World Bank there was considerable debate in which borrower governments
had important parts. The Structural Adjustment Loans first offered in 1980 were a new venture
into program lending for broad purposes rather than specific projects, and came with macro-level
and meso-level policy conditions that inspired criticism from the academics and UN aid agencies
as overly “neoliberal.” Developing country governments joined this chorus of criticism, though
without using the word “neoliberal.” Meanwhile, borrow governments declined to take the loans
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even though their access to convenient financing from private Western banks dried up when real
interest rates moved from -0.6% in 1977 to 12.8% in 1981 (Dornbusch and Fischer 1987) as a
result of major Western governments’ efforts to bring down inflation. The private banks had
protected themselves against this possibility by shifting to floating interest rates. Developing
countries were caught because many were rolling over rather than repaying loans. The new
interest rates suddenly and significantly increased their debt service burdens, and their financial
situation became much worse when private lending fell off and then “stopped, just simply
stopped” in 1984 (Brau 1986: 38). Even with debt restructuring agreements in place by 1987,
many commentators considered the 1980s a “lost decade” for development because of these
financial disruptions.
Despite these financial straits, borrower governments showed little interest in Structural
Adjustment Loans because of policy conditions requiring reduction of the government’s direct
role in the economy. Only 20 were finalized between 1980 and 1983 (Hoguet 1983: 319). This
pushback inspired the World Bank’s 1983 shift towards more focused Sectoral Adjustment
Loans (Petersmann 1988: 51) which borrowers were more willing to take (World Bank 1986;
Jayarajah and Branson 1995; Owusu 2003: 159). For borrowers, the conditions attached to these
new type of loans had the positive feature of distinguishing more clearly between government
programs providing services to people and other government spending, but also the negative
feature of continued focus on reducing government payrolls and the extent of state-owned
enterprise. Borrower governments thus kept up their complaints about World Bank policy
conditions (e.g., the 1986 UN General Assembly Special Session on Africa; comments on the
Baker Plan in G24 1986a: par. 8; G24 1987: par 45-51).
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Structural Adjustment Loans and Sectoral Adjustment Loans were lumped together in the
stinging critiques of World Bank lending by leftist economists and a chorus of UN Aid Agencies
led by UNICEF. Both streams of critique devoted considerable attention to the negative impact
on the poorest parts of developing country populations, something that could now be analyzed in
more detail as economists had acquired better analytical tools for assessing the distributional
effects of aid in the mid-1980s (see Bourguignon, de Melo, and Morrisson 1991) and could
analyze the impact of World Bank lending in new ways (e.g., Addison and Demery 1985). This
round of discussion did not challenge the conclusion that outside funds, including Word Bank
and IDA loans, aided growth, but did confirm the negative effects of then-current aid on the poor
(e.g., Pastor 1987). By the time UNICEF issued Adjustment with a Human Face (Cornea, Jolly,
and Stewart 1987), bringing the income distribution critique of structural adjustment policies to
wider audiences, other economists – including some working for the World Bank – were
reaching similar conclusions (e.g. Helleiner 1987; Hannevik 1987; Bassett 1988; Hodges 1988).
Meanwhile, a higher level internal change was underway in the World Bank. Poverty
reduction was again moved up among Bank priorities, particularly after former US Congressman
Barber Conable replaced Clausen as president in July 1986 (Kanbur and Vines 2000: 98),
although outside commentators did not perceive this until “Poverty” was the main theme of the
Bank’s 1990 World Development Report. More visible was US Treasury Secretary James
Baker’s reference to “adjustment with growth” in October 1985, which suggested that the US
government was moderating its policy line. This provided a wider opening for questioning the
policy prescriptions guiding the design of all forms of structural adjustment lending (Kahler
1990: 47-48).
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Borrower governments were able to do more than complain. As later studies revealed
(World Bank 1988; Moseley, Harrigan and Toye 1991; Killick 1998), there was more
negotiating about loan conditions going on than most outside observers perceived at the time.
Borrower government positions on several matters were supported by the smaller Western
industrial states (James 1996: 525) as well as UN development agencies. Many borrower
governments could also draw on their overall ties to major Western states or their ability to play
off the Cold War blocs against one another to keep loan money flowing. They also benefitted
from the World Bank’s need to keep money flowing, resulting partly from need to sustain its
own activities (Ranis 1997: 79-81; Gilbert and Vines 2000: 22-23; Ranis 2006) and partly from
realization that suspending or terminating loan disbursements on project loans would undo
intended effects by seriously disrupting their progress.
Nor did back-and-forth between the World Bank and borrowers end when the loan
agreement was signed. Borrowers could, and did, fail to meet conditions they had accepted
(Collier 2000: 301-03), either because initial acceptance was reluctant or because later events
outside borrower government control prevented full compliance. With any condition not
specified as a Prior Action (a category the Bank first used in 2000), Bank management could
respond to failure to meet a condition by 1) waiving it, 2) extending the deadline for meeting it,
3) replacing the current loan with a new loan having different conditions, or 4) cancel
disbursement of the remainder of the loan. Only the third and fourth interrupt cash flows. The
third is mildly punitive because it delays money payments and can affect project or program
completion timelines; the fourth is strongly punitive because expected money is no longer
available. As the decade of the 1980s proceeded, generous interpretation of these possibilities
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came to predominate because the World Bank realized that political factors outside borrower
control often hobbled performance (Killick 1995).
Though a cursory reading of the public contentions between 1974 and 1985 suggested
that government following ISI policies were strongly committed to them, some development
economists (Diaz-Alejandro 1965; Little, Scitovsky, and Scott 1970; Balassa and others 1971;
Corden 1974) were already expressing doubts about their viability. In the mid-1980s developing
country government officials began to join the doubters (Fajnzylber 1986; debates in UN
General Assembly 1986; G24 1987: par 31). Several more specific policies commonly pursued
by developing countries – overvaluing the national currency, tolerating low efficiency in state
enterprises for the sake of other policy goals, pricing policies favoring urban over rural areas,
and permitting extensive rent-seeking by elites through various public sector practices were
subjected to increasingly detailed domestic criticism (see Cardoso and Helwege 1992: 84-99 on
Latin American experience).
2.3 Events and Reduced Contention 1988-1997
Public dissemination of comparative economic data about member countries’ economies
by UN agencies, the World Bank, and research institutes also began having an effect in the mid1980s. Anyone paying attention, including borrower governments, found it difficult to ignore
the differences in growth rates between countries with inward-oriented and outward-oriented
economies shown by comparing Latin American and East Asian experience in the 1980s (Graph
1).
[Graph 1 here]
Such comparison led several governments that had been pursuing ISI to acknowledge its limits
as a development strategy, and groups of economists and government officials ready to
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abandon ISI emerged in several countries (Callaghy 1989; Urzúa 1997: 107-08 on Mexico;
Mengisteab 1992 on some African states; Gwinne and Kay 2000 on Latin America).
These doubts were reinforced by growing realization that global economic changes were
making some meso-level policies common to ISI irrelevant. Until the mid-1970s developing
country governments with strong administrative capability, such as those of India and the larger
Latin American countries, were confident that they could identify the best available technologies
and acquire them as-needed through commercial licensing arrangements or as a condition of
allowing a foreign company to establish a subsidiary in the country. As manufacturing was
transformed by use of computers, computer-guided robots, and information technology, most
state-owned enterprises in developing countries were unable to keep up (Bhagavan 1990) and
their owner governments aware that the overall pace of technological change was accelerating
(Junne 2001: 198-199). As G77 efforts to include provisions for obligatory transfer of
technology to developing counties in the NIEO program foundered at the UN, developing
governments realized that they would have to work with, rather than avoid, foreign corporations
in industries where technology was changing rapidly.
Developing country-based economists’ questioning the continued utility of ISI as an
action path to development became sharper (noted in Thakur 1993; Ndegwa 1997; Junne 2001:
198). The typical industrial enterprise created under ISI policies had relatively small production
runs focused on the home market. In most counties (large ones like Brazil, India, and Mexico
were exceptions), this resulted in higher prices because the enterprises could not capture the full
economies of scale. Most of them also needed continual supply of imported materials since the
industries chosen were selected on the basis of what the country was importing rather than what
could be produced wholly or mainly using local materials. As balances of payments weakened
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in the 1970s, partly to pay for oil and partly because of lower commodity export prices, financing
this more expensive local production became more difficult. By the mid-1980s, governments of
countries with relatively large middle classes were also feeling domestic pressures to change
policy from consumers desiring lower consumer goods prices and from local entrepreneurs
interested in developing their own exporting enterprises (Junne 2001: 198).
Academic debates about economic theory were simultaneously creating room for
developing new meso-level propositions about development. Marxist, dependency, and worldsystems theories were all focused on national or global economic system level propositions and
tended to pay less attention to developing midlevel analytical propositions sufficiently clear to
guide economic policy. Karl Marx had relied heavily on the classical economics of his time
when developing his economic theories (Samuelson 1967) while later Marxists regarded mesolevel propositions about running capitalist market economies (noted in Robinson 1971) or largely
agrarian economies (noted in Ake 2001) as irrelevant to socialist economies. Dependency theory
did identify a number of macro-level steps countries should take – de-link from the West,
overthrow elites insufficiently attuned to local aspirations, prevent intrusion of consumer culture
influences – but provided little guidance about actually running an economy (a point
acknowledged by Di Palma 1981: chapter 1; Gunder Frank 1981: 127; Akiapor 1985: 551),
leaving economic policy makers to rely on broadly neoclassical economic analysis (Hirschman
1986; Flynn 1986).
These acknowledgements came at a time when policy ideas emanating from behavioral
and institutionalist economics provided denser sets of midlevel theoretical propositions that
challenged strident neoliberalism, and from new neoclassical economic theorizing that supported
Market-oriented but not non-neoliberal policy conclusions. The endogenous growth theory first

Borrower Government influence on World Bank Loan Conditions
26

August 2021 draft

page

advanced in the late 1980s (e.g., Lucas 1988; Romer 1990) included technological advances and
increases in labor skill/productivity as independent contributors to growth, a conclusion
supported by comparing the time needed to double national income in the early phases of
industrialization from 60 years in the UK (1780-1840) to some ten years in South Korea (19661977) and China (1977-1987) (The Economist 1991). By suggesting that countries need to keep
up with the technological frontier and continually invest in enhancing worker skills, a
neoclassical path to advice similar to that of human capacities approaches to development came
into being.
Other academic work supported doubts that the insulation of local markets needed for
most versions of ISI was good for an economy in the long run. Some studies confirmed the
longstanding neoclassical claim that interest rate subsidies limit growth by hobbling sectors of
the economy that do not receive them. Others cast doubt on the protective tariff component of
ISI by distinguishing between two phases. While a short period of tariff protection would help by
insulating local firms from foreign competition as they “learn by doing” (the rationale for
“infant-industry protection” going back to Alexander Hamilton 1791 and Friedrich List 1841)
prolonged tariff protection hurts by allowing local firms continue inefficient operations, poor
quality control, and non-responsiveness to changing customer preferences (e.g., Taylor 1998).
Thus the late 1980s were marked by some convergence between centrist and moderate
left analysts and policy commentators. The unimpressive results of Chilean (1971-73) and
Peruvian (1975) experiments with structuralist-inspired policies (Kahler 1990: 40 and note 20)
persuaded a good number of economists from other developing countries that their country’s
economic problems did have internal as well as external roots, with the external ones setting
outer boundaries and the mix of short-, medium-, and long-term policies adopted by the
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government determining the country’s actual economic path. The equally unimpressive results
of neoliberal-inspired policy experiments in Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay in the early 1980s
created new openings for critique going too far in reducing regulation of private enterprise from
the center and center-right finding echoes in new interpretations of neoclassical economic theory
(Kahler 1990: 48-52).
Meanwhile, a significant number of observers (e.g. Callaghy 1989; Deyo 1987; Wade
1989, 1990), were pointing out that East Asian governments were not following policies based
on either structuralist/dependency or neoclassical theory. Inspired by Japan’s post-1945
success, which had been the subject of some attention in the West (e.g. Vogel 1979; Johnson
1982), these governments pursued what Johnson (1995) called a “developmental state” vision of
export-led growth. Rather than leaving private firms to their own devices, the government uses
tax relief, subsidies, and other industrial policy measures (e.g., Hughes 1988; White 1988), to
secure higher GDP by pushing them towards production for export while limiting the extent of
income inequality (e.g., Bates 1989; Gereffi and Wyman 1990).

World Bank reports

downplayed the developmental state (Wade 1996), and whatever attention it might have gotten
was reduced by revelations of slow growth or even shrinkage in Soviet-style centrally-planned
economies followed by the political collapse of the Soviet bloc and the of the USSR itself.
The Chinese Communist Party followed Soviet developments closely and in the late
1980s began allowing competition between state-owned firms and market-set pricing so that it
could maintain its monopoly of political control (Brandt and Rawski 2008). Latin American
governments also began adopting new policies inspired by economic rethinking (e.g.,
suggestions in Balassa, Bueno, Kuczynski, and Simonsen, 1986). Some structuralists were
developing what they called a “neostructuralist analysis” that gave more attention to domestic
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sources of economic inefficiency (e.g., UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean 1992; Sunkel 1993; also discussed in Gwinne and Kay 2000). The UN Economic
Commission for Africa, which continued to provide African governments with a forum for
discussing common economic challenges, produced a new statement on economic policy (UN
Economic Commission for Africa 1989) reflecting a very different orientation than had prevailed
in the Lagos Plan. While emphasizing the importance of not going too far in reliance on
international trade for economic growth or in reduction of state enterprises, it did accept the basic
neoclassical contention that African economies needed some restructuring. By 1985 even Soviet
advisers were giving developing countries advice little different from that provided by the World
Bank (e.g., 1985 Soviet memo for the Marxist government of Ethiopia quoted in Henze 1988).
Had arguments remained focused on how to best promote economic growth in
developing countries, there might have been more room for considering the East Asian approach.
However the implosion of the Soviet bloc and of the USSR itself emboldened the growing
community of avowedly neoliberal economists around the world. Though few phrased it as
vividly as Margaret Thatcher’s often-quoted "there is no alternative" (see Margaret Thatcher
Foundation 2016) they did claim that no other policy choices would be as good for any country
at any income level as a combination of market economy, lightly-regulated private enterprise,
and openness to international trade and investment.
Thoughts that import substituting industrialization and export-led growth could be
regarded as complementary strategies to be used at different times in a country’s economic
development (e.g., Gereffi 1990: 22; Bradford 1990: 32-36) also attracted little attention. When
Japan moved from sustained growth to persisting stagnation after domestic real estate and
financial bubbles burst in the early 1990s (e.g., Krugman 1994; Pempel 1998), existing questions

Borrower Government influence on World Bank Loan Conditions
29

August 2021 draft

page

about export-led growth (e.g., Ram 1987; Klein 1990) were expressed more widely, particularly
by advocates of following the rival strategy of domestic demand-led growth (DDLG) (e.g.,
Medina-Smith 2000; Felipe and Lim 2005).
The transformed policy climate of the immediate post-Cold War period was most vividly
expressed in the notion of a “Washington Consensus” (Williamson 1990) on how to best
promote development. Though many mid-level aspects domestic economic policy remained
open to debate, several longstanding contentions seemed to have been settled in conclusions that
developing countries would be better off if they 1) linked up with the international economy, 2)
encouraged private enterprise, 3) improved protection of private property rights, 4) reduced
reliance on state-owned enterprises, and 5) removed tax credits, subsidies, and other measures
that distort prices and interest rates. Even the UNDP, which had often endorsed self-reliance
policies in the past, was suggesting that “poor countries can leapfrog several decades of
development if they combine their low wages with basic education, technical education, and
export-led growth, taking advantage of the rapidly opening global markets” (UNDP 1998: 10).
This shift in beliefs about the relative efficacy of meso level action paths did not affect
the ongoing shift in development thinking towards the importance of poverty reduction. Starting
in 1990 the UNDP’s Human Development Index provided a new focus for long-standing efforts
to widen assessment of progress toward development by including how well economic growth
improved the lives of ordinary people as emphasized by advocates “basic human needs” (e.g.,
Stewart 1989) and “human development” (Sen 1985; Haq and Kirdir 1986) approaches. This
was reflected in a significant reformulation of World Bank program lending in the early 1990
that replaced both SALs and SECALs with Development Policy Loans. Under this program,
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borrower governments were expected to indicate both their expectations regarding economic
growth and measures they would take to reduce poverty in their Policy Framework Papers.
By the mid-1990s household income data permitted assessing the impact aid, including
Bank and IDA loans lending on income distribution in borrower countries. Ferreira (1995) and
Ferreira and Keeley (2000: 2 and 189) identified three patterns of country experience with
structural adjustment lending. Some experienced no shift into a sustained higher growth
trajectory; others shifted into a growth pattern reducing extreme poverty but not significantly
affecting overall inequality; yet others shifted into a broadly beneficial growth pattern after a
period of reduced living standards among the bulk of the population. World Bank research
economists’ own studies (e.g., Kanbur 1990; Jayaraja and Branson, 1995) confirmed that several
years often passed between starting structural adjustment programs and onset of higher growth
rates.

Some studies demonstrated correlations between growth and improved social indicators

like infant mortality in most developing countries (e.g., Bruno, Ravallion, and Squire 1998),
suggesting that growth is often needed for improvement in those areas. Arguments for paying
attention to poverty reduction were also strengthened by emerging endogenous growth models
that turned the causal arrow around to claim that extensive poverty and steep inequality inhibit
economic growth while provision of basic social services – health care, education, safe water,
and adequate housing – to all promotes growth (e.g., Strauss and Thomas 1997; Bourgignon,
Chong, Hentschel and Saavedra 2003).
2.4 Nonstate Actors
Different types of nonstate actors joined the arguments about defining development at
different times. Academic economists, research institutes, and policy think tanks were all active
in discussions of development from the start. Transnational NGOs and advocacy coalitions
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interested in advancing environmental, social, and human rights concerns through development
aid became active in the 1970s and sought to get their views incorporated into World Bank loan
conditions. These efforts have involved discussions with and public campaigns against the
World Bank, building coalitions between NGOs based in western countries and NGOs based in
developing countries, lobbying borrower governments, and lobbying major shareholder
governments. They have had some effect on World Bank activity, though the extent of that
effect has been determined in significant part by governments’ reactions to the advocacy. World
Bank leadership has varied in its receptivity to their ideas while member governments’ reactions
have ranged from willing to listen (examples below) to actively seeking to limit or eliminate
their activity (examples in Igoe and Kelsall 2005; Heiss and Kelley 2017; Fu 2017).
Social concerns became easiest to incorporate into World Bank loan conditions once
poverty reduction became a higher priority goal in the 1990s because poverty reduction became
redefined to include promoting gender equity, extending the benefits of development to
marginalized groups, and reducing urban-rural infrastructure and social services gaps. In the
1990s many borrower governments regarded loans for expanding social services as “second
best” to the infrastructure projects they really wanted to pursue, but the intensity of controversy
over large infrastructure projects meant that they realized it would be easier to get approval for
these kinds of loans (Lyne, Nelson, and Tierney 2009: 420). Yet they also endorsed paying
attention to social programs (e.g., G24 1991: par 39 and 43; G24 1995: par. 19).
The meshing of poverty-reduction and social concerns was particularly visible during
negotiation of the 10th (1993) 12th (1999), and 13th (2002) IDA replenishments in which NGOs
lobbied member governments supplying the money to support directing IDA loans to countries
pursuing effective poverty reduction efforts (Clegg 2013: 48). It continued to be reflected
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discussions of among economists (see Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor, 2004) and advocacy
groups (e.g. Action Aid 2004; Eurodad 2006) suggesting that the World Bank should drop most
of its economic policy conditions but require borrowers to maintain social spending even during
economic downturns.
Incorporating environmental concerns inspired much more contention. As
environmentalist campaigns gathered momentum in the early to mid-1980s, borrower
governments reacted as negatively to environmental conditions as they did to other policy
conditions (e.g. G24 1982: par. 8; G24 1986: par. 28; G24 1987: par. 34). This chilly recepetion
did not discourage transnational campaigning, which began with efforts to get the World Bank to
strengthen the environmental guidelines it had adopted in the early 1980s (policies and dates of
adoption noted in Fox and Brown 1998: 506) and soon spread to seeking significant changes in
large projects with obvious environmental effects (see table of cases in Fox and Brown 1998:
500-505).
Advocacy coalitions also used the need for legislative approval of money for the periodic
replenishments of IDA funds in the leading donor countries to gain leverage over Bank policies.
In 1989 they persuaded some the US Congress and some other legislatures to condition funding
the 9th IDA replenishment on tightening and more consistently implementing Bank policies
intended to reduce the social dislocations and environmental impacts of large infrastructure
projects. The US Congress was also persuaded to maintain the pressure by holding back 25% of
the US share of the Bank’s 1989 general capital increase (Bowles and Kormos 1995: 793) and
the third year of funding for the 10th IDA replenishment in 1992 (Udall 1998: 402-403).
Most of these efforts were pursued on a project-by-project basis, with different coalitions
of campaigning partners depending on the borrowing country and the type of project involved.
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In this period, borrower government resistance reflected the widely-shared G77 perception that
environmental concerns were simply another way to limit their prospects for industrialization.
Not until preparations for the UN’s 1992 Conference on Development and Environment were
underway were that the issue was framed in ways that allayed these concerns. However, borrow
governments were still interested in pursuing their major projects, as demonstrated by the very
public controversies over Bank loans for the Planaflora (Rondônia Natural Resources
Management Plan) project in Brazil in 1990-96 and the Narmada River Dam Project (more often
called the Sardar Sarovar Dam Controversy after the largest of the dams) in India to build
hydroelectric facilities and reservoirs for irrigation systems in 1991-95.
Both NGO campaigners and borrower governments found supporters in different parts of
the World Bank staff. This was most obvious in arguments over the road construction through a
remote and undisturbed area of the Himalayas associated with the Arun III Dam in Nepal. The
project was criticized on environmental, social (impact on indigenous populations), and
economic grounds (an overly large project dependent on sales of electricity to neighboring India)
and in the course of the arguments the Bank’s chief manager for health, education, and
population projects in Nepal took early retirement to publicly campaign against the project while
the vice president for Asia argued inside that abandoning the project would signal that World
Bank could not support major infrastructure projects at a time when major borrowers were very
interested in them. The argument was ended in 1995 when newly-arrived Bank president
Wolfensohn decided to abandon the project (Rich 2002: 29).
By the late 1990s, it was clear that larger borrowing countries could have the last say in
these controversies. Brazilian and Indian government decisions were the main shapers of the
Planaflora and Narmada Dam Projects. China very vocally withdrew its application for World
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Bank financing towards the cost of the Three Gorges Dam project. A few of the larger borrower
governments openly opposed advocacy coalition participation in infrastructure lending (Brazilian
President Cardoso’s comments reported in Folha de Sao Paulo, 10 July 1999: 3, quoted in Fox
2002: 157, note 35* and Chinese government statement quoted in Roos 2011: 479). Since few
other sources of multilateral or single-country development finance imposed environmental
policy conditions (Wade 2004), and several middle income borrowers also had access to private
finance, China had no difficulty replacing the Bank loans (McDonald-Wilmsen and Webber
2010: *). In September 1997, the Brazilian and Indian Executive Directors were able to rally
enough votes from Executive Directors representing other borrowers, France, and Italy to defeat
a proposal that the World Bank Inspection Panel investigate claims regarding violation of
resettlement policies relating to the Itaparca Dam project in Brazil (Fox 2002: 157-58).
The extent of borrower government pushback against environmental and resettlement
conditions on infrastructure lending was not apparent from the total volume of World Bank
lending, which was maintained by a stream of loans to Eastern European and former Soviet
states, but is revealed in the details of loan activity in the Bank’s Annual Reports (Graph 2).
[Graph 2 here]
While World Bank management took steps to lessen the distance between its loan
conditions and middle income borrowers’ desires (see discussion of the Bank’s Strategic
Compact with borrowers summarized in World Bank Annual Report 1998: 3), NGOs and
transnational advocacy coalitions remained active, keeping up the pressure on the World Bank to
revise its policies and develop more transparent processes of receiving and evaluating the merits
of local complaints about particular program or project loans (Fox and Brown, eds 1998; Gutner
2005; McDonald and Wilmsen 2010). An opportunity for local nonstate actors to get involved
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opened up in 1999 when the World Bank modified the process of consultation with borrower
governments leading to what were now called Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers to include
some consultation with other local stakeholders in 1999. Borrower governments did not always
like the process but some were able to use it to challenge Bank suggestions and negotiate revised
loan terms (Gulrajani 2007: 58-59) while governments already doing more consultation with
civil society groups, such as those of Indonesia, Bolivia now had international-level endorsement
of that activity. Soon notions of participation were expanded to the process of formulating
particular projects to be financed by Bank or IDA loans (Clegg 2013: 121-122). Some borrowers
accepted these new expectations, but others did not. Critics on the left were unimpressed,
regarding the whole PSRP exercise as a way to ignore the need for far-reaching redistribution of
land and income, and greater enhancement of the rights of labor and marginalized groups (e.g.,
Cooke 2005: 261).
2.5 After the Asian Crisis
[This section will need revision to focus on the tapering of World Bank ability to impose
conditions so that post-2008 can be eliminated and the paper go to the conclusion.]
The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 inspired another round of debate about what
combination of general economic policies and programs addressing human needs should guide
development. As most prominently evidenced by Joseph’s Stiglitz’s appointment as Chief
Economist, the World Bank was not strongly neoliberal in outlook. Stiglitz joined in the
controversies over IMF advice to Asian countries (including borrower government critiques
expressed in G24 2000: par. 19; G24 2001: par. 12; and G24 2002: par 19) by offering an
alternative agenda for development for the 21st century (Stiglitz 1998). Though the Bank’s
association with such comments appeared to end when negative US government reaction to
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Stiglitz’s public comments led World Bank President Wolfensohn to dismiss Stiglitz in February
2000, he was only the most prominent internal advocate of avoiding the excesses of
neoliberalism.
The Asian Crisis had less effect on macroeconomic debates than might have been
expected for three reasons. First, there were several competing explanations of why the crisis
occurred (Goldstein 1998), only some of which related directly to the relative merits of
neoliberal and other approaches to national economic policy. Second, critics of neoliberal
policies were not able to offer visions of plausible action-paths to development based on
adopting policies of extensive protectionism and trade discrimination. Third, and most
importantly, the stringent neoliberalism articulated by Thatcher and Reagan had faded even in
the UK and the USA well before the Asian Crisis. The “Washington Consensus” of the early
1990s was not neoliberal in the Thatcher-Reagan sense (Williamson 2004: 2), though it is still
often described that way. Its suggestions were open to varying interpretations by governments
and other actors (Naim 2000), leaving room for lightly regulated market economies, more
extensively regulated market economies, mixed economies, and export-led growth.
With better data available, academic researchers and policy groups were focusing more at
the meso level, on the impact of specific policies and institutional arrangements on development.
The results of this round of inquiry provided challenge to earlier conclusions (e,g, Mosely,
Herrington and Toye 1995) that lax enforcement of conditions had been the primary reason for
so little change. Rather, rates of compliance were found to depend on the type of policy
involved. An IMF study (IMF 2001) indicated that borrowers’ efforts depended partly on the
type of condition involved, with 57% of conditions regarding pension system reform or
reorganization of state-owned enterprises and 47% of those related to privatization fulfilled in
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time. Trade policy conditions also elicited a high rate of compliance (Krueger and Rajapatirana
1999). Other inquiries indicated a basic political lesson: that the extent and intensity of domestic
opposition to the type of change being sought affected compliance (e.g., Ivanova et al. 2003;
Mayer and Mourmouras 2008). Stone (2002), Mercer-Blackman and Unigovskaya (2004), and
Pop-Eleches (2008) all indicated that full privatization was the least likely change because the
relatively long time involved in preparing for sale of state-owned enterprises gives domestic
opponents more opportunity to organize political counter-pressures.
The World Bank’s own Assessing Aid (1998) study went in a somewhat different
direction by suggesting that aid was more effective when borrower governments chose certain
policies and built up strong administrative institutions, a conclusion broadly supported by two
later studies (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Collier and Dollar 2001). Though others challenged
claims that countries with “good policies” experienced higher growth rates (Hansen and Tarp
2001; Easterly, Levine and Roodman 2003; Ram 2004), they did not challenge arguments that
successful economic reform requires strong commitment by governments and significant
domestic constituencies to accomplishing it. However, many low income country borrower
governments remained hobbled by lack of sufficient analytical capacity to estimate the effect of
government macroeconomic policies on poverty or to their link growth strategies and poverty
reduction strategies (Cheru 2006).
Adoption of the Millennium Development Goals outcome measures defined by
improvements in individuals’ conditions and of tracking levels of government spending
benefitting the poor (e.g. the “pro-poor expenditure index” in Mosley, Hudson, and Verschoor
2004) gave further impetus to redefining how borrowers qualified for Bank or IDA loans. This
discussion reinforced a shift in how the World Bank approached the question of loan conditions
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that had been underway for some time. In 1977 World Bank staff had begun conducting annual
Country Performance Reviews of policies and implementation efforts and taking them into some
account when approving IDA loans. The Reviews were given greater weight in a 1989 decision
to link total IDA lending for any one country to the results of the Review. For countries with a
population between 2 and 50 million, a “high” rating opened up SDR 8.75 per capita in IDA
lending, a “moderate” rating SDR 5.36 per capita, and a “low” rating SDR 2.77 per capita
(Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997: 1152-53). In 1998 the scheme was revised and renamed the
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment in 1998 (described in IDA 2003). A similar system,
defining eligibility for types of loans rather than amounts of money, was adopted for borrower
members eligible for a mix of Bank and IDA loans. Borrowers with policies rated “very good”
were eligible for accelerated debt relief and program loans supporting policy reform and socialsector programs (education, health, and rural infrastructure), borrowers with “moderate to poor”
policies were eligible for social-sector program loans, and borrowers with very weak policies
eligible for only for specific project loans (Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor, 2004: F219).
While borrower governments continued to press for reduction in the number of loan
conditions (e.g., G24 2000: par.15), this shift in focus changed contention over loan conditions in
four ways. First, conditions were divided into two types – “prior actions” to be accomplished
before any of the loan money is disbursed and “tranche release conditions” to be met before a
second or later disbursement occurs, altering the balance between negotiating about conditions
before the loan is signed and failing to meet already-accepted conditions. Second, it reduced the
number of specific conditions attached to particular loans, as shown in table 1.
[Table 1 here]
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Third, it led the World Bank to drop the types of conditions identified as be least likely to be
met. It largely dropped privatization and trade liberalization from its conditions after 2003
(World Bank 2005), and rates of compliance increased (Bull and others 2006). Fourth, it focused
contention on defining the components of the performance assessments, which have been revised
several times (IDA 2003; Van Waeyenberge 2006; IEG 2008; Steets 2008).
The contention over components was informed by a new round of studies explicitly
incorporating the political dynamics involved in implementing reform. Newer studies concluded
– as critics of structural adjustment lending (e.g., Drèze and Sen 1989; Cornia and Stewart 1990)
had argued – that adjustment policies would be pursued only if governments also took measures
to limit the negative short to medium term impacts of reform on the poorer parts of the
population (e.g., Bourguignon, Branson and de Melo 1992; Morduch 1995; Jalan and Revallion
1999). Several analysts concluded that three factors – strong government commitment to
implementing economic reform, the region where the country is located, and the country’s
domestic political and economic conditions – were most directly correlated with getting a
lagging economy back on a growth path (studies summarized in Ferreira and Keely 2000: 170175). The new emphasis on “country ownership” shifted attention to governments’ ability to
maintain domestic support, setting aside older conclusions (e.g., Skidmore 1977; Frenkel and
O’Donnell 1979; Diaz-Alejandro 1981) that authoritarian governments were better able to bring
about serious economic change because they could insulate themselves from short-term shifts in
public opinion.
The attention on and contention over meso-level design of action paths were reinforced
by two World Bank initiatives in 1999. It introduced the Comprehensive Development
Framework placing greater emphasis on borrower government leadership in formulating a
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country’s development strategy and also began requiring member governments of low income
countries to develop Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PSRPs). A UNDP study undertaken in
2003-4 indicated that 43 of the 78 borrower governments eligible for IDA loans supported the
requirement to produce a PSRP and took seriously the process of consultation with social groups
that the Bank encouraged (UNDP 2004: 7). A few years later, the UN Economic Commission
for Africa undertook an assessment of the new PSRP process in the 12 “pilot” countries that had
begun the process in 2000 and concluded that the results of the process depended heavily on the
extent to which a national government had sufficient administrative and budgeting capacity and
willing to go beyond highly staged discussions with civil society and private sector stakeholders
(Cheru 2006).
2.6 2008 and After [this section will be removed]
The 2008 financial crisis inspired another round of sharp criticisms of programs for
dismantling state-owned enterprises and reducing government regulation of economic activity
emanating from individual commentators and social movements to UN bodies (UN General
Assembly 2009; Stiglitz Commission 2009). Much of the contention focused on re-regulating
the financial sector and returning to the Keynesian emphasis on using government
macroeconomic measures, not just fiscal policy, to temper business cycles. Both issues were
taken up elsewhere – in the Group of 20 and in the Bank for International Settlement’s Basel
Committee on Banking Regulation.
Though China experienced reduced growth as its main customers went into recession, the
contrast between moderate decreases in growth rate in the main emerging economies and steeper
decreases in the established advanced economy countries, particularly after the separate
Eurocrisis intensified after 2010, sparked revived interest in Asian-style state guidance of private
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enterprise activity. It also inspired renewal of earlier arguments (e.g. Breslin 1999; Felipe and
Lim 2005) that larger developing countries should shift form export-led to domestic demand-led
growth (e.g., UNCTAD 2013; Mishra and Nancharaiah 2016).
As it became clear that emerging and developing countries were experiencing less
recession and faster recovery than much of the West and Japan, they also became more attractive
to private investors. In 2013 Rwanda received $3.5 billion in offers to buy the $400 million
worth of bonds it wanted to sell internationally, as well as loans from China (Herbst and Mills
2013). Direct private investment in developing countries became increasingly prominent, as
indicated in Table 2.
[Table 2 here]
The growth of private investment was visible even in Africa, where the respective sums in 2012
were $5.6 billion in Bank and IDA loan commitments and $46 million in private direct
investments or loans (Herbst and Mills 2013), though the least developed countries as a group
attracted only about 6% of the private foreign direct investment flowing to middle and low
income countries (OECD 2020).
Another source of finance opened up when China and other emerging market countries
began providing development finance bilaterally or through the New Development Bank
(“BRICS Bank”) established in 2014 and the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
established in 2015. Their statements that no policy conditions would be attached to loans
appealed to continuing borrower dislike of such conditions (e.g. G24 2014: par. 17). With total
Western and Japanese bilateral aid declining, the “new donors,” led by China and Saudi Arabia,
also became significant sources of finance (). Overall, the World Bank was becoming a much
less prominent source of development finance ()
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World Bank management was aware of these trends and their implications. It was
acknowledging in 2009 that “Because [middle income countries] have access to alternative
sources of finance and have the analytic and technical capacity to design and implement
programs, they are increasingly selective about the program areas in which they invite Bank
engagement” (World Bank 2009: 16). As low income countries began securing get large project
loans elsewhere, even outside analysts noted that the World Bank’s ability to insist on policy
conditions beyond what borrowers wanted to accept for their own reasons had eroded
significantly (Prizzon, Greenhill and Mustapha, 2016; Hernandez 2017).
In 2012 the World Bank adopted a new loan category, Program for Results, supporting
existing government programs with loan disbursements following the meeting of specific
achievement indicators. This met a borrower desire at a time when other sources of loans were
increasing, and also reflected the influence of transnational network advocating “aid
effectiveness” movement (Winters and Kulkarni 2014). Yet early reviews were mixed with the
World Bank’s Operations Policy and Country Services Department giving positive reviews
(World Bank 2015: vi) and the Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) identifying several
areas of weakness (IEG 2016).
3. Conclusion
The existence and content of relevance and efficacy criteria provide the addressees in an
authority relationship with two ways to affect the authority holder’s instructions and related
actions. At any particular time relevance criteria provide guides for prospective assessment of
whether instructions are based on action paths that appear likely to enhance goal attainment
while efficacy criteria provide guides for retrospective assessment that following instructions
actually did enhance goal attainment. They provide the bounds for negotiation of conditions
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attached to any one loan. Both criteria also shift over time as changes in technology, beliefs, the
relative capacity of individual participants to pursue the goal, and learning from earlier
experience lead to refinement. The process of shifting shared criteria gives addressees additional
opportunities to affect authority holder instructions as they participate with other actors in the
process of re-setting the relevance and efficacy benchmarks.
The extent of contestation within an authority relationship over the relative merits of
different action paths and therefore of addressee pushback against authority holder instructions
varies with the extent of convergence between authority holder and addressee assessments of the
action paths being suggested. This look at contestation between the World Bank and its
borrower member governments suggests that contention will be relatively mild in two distinct
situations. The first is when any of multiple action paths appear likely to produce roughly
equally favorable results, and authority holder instructions accommodate addressee choices of
different paths. The second is when there is strong consensus among the authority holder and all
addressees that a small number of action paths are clearly superior to others, and authority holder
instructions indicate those few paths.
In the 1950s and 1960s, a combination of contestation over how to best organize an
economy for development – market, mixed economy, and central planning – and the apparently
similar efficacy of multiple action paths prevailed. The World Bank management did have
preferred policy advice, and borrower governments reacted to it with more or less enthusiasm,
meaning that there was some contention over loan conditions and related policy advice existed,
but it seldom produced public disagreements between the World Bank and borrower
governments.
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Greater turbulence in the international economy after 1971, increased assertiveness of
preferred positions by many borrower governments, and sharp disagreements about handling the
Third World debt crisis of the mid-1980s inspired sharper contentions. Much of this contention
was fueled by strong differences in macro-level visions of paths to development while a
significant portion also arose from contention over whether the primary obstacles to development
existed in the structure of the international economy as a whole, or at the national level in the
choices of governments and other domestic actors. Contention was fed by strong divergence of
views regarding action plans, with structuralist and dependency theorists offering very different
ideas than the very market-oriented theorists whose ideas became known as neoliberalism by
1980.
Yet the contention between the World Bank and borrower governments, individually or
as a group, never became a simple World Bank versus borrowers confrontation because there
were internal divisions within the structuralist, dependency, and market-oriented groups. World
Bank management and staff never adopted thorough neoliberalism, and individual borrower
governments followed a variety of paths. Though using some policies similar to those followed
by advocates of ISI, the government of India stayed out of the debates; some Latin American
governments never adopted ISI, and East Asian governments went in a different direction.
Greater awareness of the different economic growth rates experienced by developing
countries in the 1980s, greater emphasis on assessing development by metrics of poverty
reduction instead of or in addition to aggregate GDP growth, and Soviet collapse, led to reduced
contention in the 1990s as borrower governments and outside observers acknowledged that
central planning and import substitution industrialization were not as effective as had been
thought. This left four distinct macro visions of how to organize a national economy in
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contention: developmental state, mixed economy, regulated market, and very lightly regulated
market models. At the same time, greater attention to policy choices regarding specific problems
stemming from a decade of advocacy and debate about making “development” benefit
individuals and households as well as countries encouraged detailed looks and resulted in some
convergence on how to address specific problems.
Since 2008, the main lines of contention has been a four-sided argument among
economic liberal, “altermondialist,”1 developmental state and economic nationalist models.
Economic liberals remain committed to open international trade and financial flows together
with some form of regulatory state at the national level. Altermondialists want interconnections
to be shaped by concerted international level regulation of private economic activity, particularly
of the financial sector, to reduce income and wealth inequality within and between states.
Developmental state advocates are currently arguing over whether development policy should
continue to follow export-led approaches or shift to domestic demand led approaches. Economic
nationalists prefer reducing interconnection through trade protectionism and other measures to
insulate national economies from each other. Yet consensus among nearly all governments that
development requires good infrastructure, continuing investment in all levels of education,
administrative capacity, and consistent rules for economic activity encourages shifting
contention over loan conditions to the meso-level and focusing on the observed or anticipated
effect of particular policy choices.
For analysts of intergovernmental organizations, this inquiry provides a more nuanced
look at how member governments retain agency in their day-to-day interactions even when an
IGO is providing them with resources and is therefore in a position to significantly influence
The French language term for what are called “antiglobalization” activists and movements in English. The French
term more accurately captures their position of accepting global interconnection but wanting it to be organized
differently than it is at present.
1
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their choices and conduct. Throughout its existence, the World Bank’s borrower member
governments have been strategic actors making two sets of calculations when presented with
loan conditions they dislike. The first is whether they can secure modifications before signing
the loan agreement. As preceding paragraphs suggest, they often succeed. The second set of
calculations comes into play when securing initial modifications fails. One alternative open at
this point is to avoid taking loans. Many borrow governments made this choice even in the
straitened circumstances of the early 1980s, and it became more feasible in stages, the 1990s as
private funds began flowing again to developing countries and in the late 2000s when new
streams of both private and government-sponsored finance became available.
When avoidance is not feasible, there are other possibilities open to borrower
governments. If they need the money badly enough, they have strong incentives to accept more
conditions than they intend to fulfill simply to get the loan and hope that non-fulfillment is not
punished later. Though aware of these borrower incentives, World Bank management has only
weak defenses against such behavior. Stopping subsequent loan disbursements for an alreadybegun project or program causes serious disruption and raises the prospect of undoing desired
development effects. The need to assure the private investors who buy the World Bank bonds
providing its working capital by maintaining a diversified loan portfolio also exerts pressure to
ensure a spread of borrowers at any particular time. Failing to maintain money flows by slowing
down the overall rate of lending threatens the bank’s ability to earn enough to pay its own
bondholders and more generally remain in operation. If borrower governments were only dimly
aware of these pressures to continue lending in the 1960s, they were certainly aware of them in
the 1980s and continue to be aware of them.
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The pressures on the World Bank to be attentive to borrower views at any moment are
defined by its perceptions of what it needs to do to maintain its own existence. The pressures on
the World Bank over time are created by the results of contentions over maintaining or altering
the relevance and efficacy criteria providing important portions of the shared understandings that
keep the authority relation in place. While the pressures to maintain organizational existence
explain why the World Bank would not press borrowers too far, it is the content of the relevance
and efficacy criteria that reveal the substantive direction taken in World Bank efforts to maintain
its own existence.
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Graph 1. Average GDP growth by region, 1961-1989

Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators. GDP growth.

Graph 2. Annual Bank Loan Commitments 1989-1997
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Table 1: average number of policy conditions per loan:
year 1995 1996 1997 1998
35
38
33
26
WB
32
21
18
IDA 31
Source: World Bank 2007: 5

1999
35
32

2000
28
20

2001
33
22

2002
27
16

2003
19
17

2004
19
12

2005
11
12

2006
11
13

2007
10
12

Table 2 World Bank and Private Investment Flows to Developing Countries (millions $US)
year

Bank and IDA loans

private DFI

2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

47,061
58,707
43,114
31,599
28,086
36,749
37,633
41,643
37,163
39,976

4,122,533
5,943,831
6,448,233
7,399,238
7,859,623
8,180,163
8,389,066
8,678,032
9,717,367
10,032,508

Bank+IDA loans as
% of private DFI
1.142
0.988
0.669
0.427
0.357
0.449
0.449
0.480
0.382
0.398

Source: World Bank Loan Data available at and IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey,
accessed 21 August 2021 at https://data.imf.org/?sk=40313609-F037-48C1-84B1E1F1CE54D6D5&sld=142436135820.

